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Abstract
The last decade, online activism has vastly
grown. In the current digital society, from
time to time citizens decide to express
their opinion by attacking large corpor-
ations digitally in some way. Where the
activists claim this to be a digital as-
sembly, others see it as criminal offences.
In this paper, we will explore the legal
and technical borders of the digital right
to assembly. By doing so, we can gain in-
sight into digital manifestations and make
up the balance on the digital right to as-
sembly. As an additional contribution, we
will discuss how the digital right to as-
sembly could be granted and which legal
and technical requirements should be set
for a digital assembly.
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1. Introduction
Due to groups like “Anonymous” and
“LulzSec”, distributed denial of service
(DDoS) attacks became a returning topic
in newspapers (Teffer 2010b). Not only are
the inner workings of a DDoS attack often
misunderstood by the general public, the
recent avalanche of attacks also showed a
new phenomenon: the DDoS attacks were
claimed to be an act of activism (Schouten
2010).
In this paper, we will investigate the use
of a DDoS attack as a means of exercising
the right of assembly1. Furthermore, we
will also discuss how a digital right to as-
sembly could be embodied in current le-
gislation. For this embodiment, we will
base ourselves on the characteristics of the
right to assembly and how this relates to
the digital world. We will also present
a set of both legal and technical require-
ments a digital assembly should comply
with.
We will start out with discussing the
general terminology, in Section 2, where
we will discuss, amongst others, the
(D)DoS, (online) activism, and the legal
subsidiarity problem. Afterwards, the
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legal part of this paper commences with
a short survey of the right of assembly, in
Section 3. In this survey, we will discuss
notable characteristics of digital availab-
ility attacks in the light of the right to
assembly. This is followed by a discussion
of attacks on availability in criminal law,
in Section 4, which also notes recent case
law on the (D)DoS. Before the legal sec-
tion is concluded, in Section 7, we will dis-
cuss the policy of the public prosecutor, in
Section 5, and civil disobedience, in Sec-
tion 6. Finally, we will focus on embody-
ing the right to assembly discussing the
option to embed it in the current legisla-
tion or to formulate complete new legis-
lation and thereby set requirements to a
digital assembly, in Section 8, followed by
a technical adoption, in Section 10.
1.1. Related work
According to Klang (2005), the current
legislation criminalising DDoS attacks in
the name of (cyber)terrorism have a seri-
ous effect on the civil rights of individuals.
Klang (2005) vouches for a more modest
approach to the DoS technique, which is
not build upon the notion of cyberterror-
ism.
Kreimer (2001) states that the digital
world has the potential of facilitating so-
cial movements of all sorts and is increas-
ingly being used for this cause2. In his
paper, besides discussing the value of the
digital world for social movements as well
as the risks, he also touches on the phe-
nomenon of hacktivism. The three dis-
cussed approaches to hacktivism are di-
gital graffiti, political attacks on systems
– under which he categorises the virtual
sit-in, which is discussed in detail in Sec-
tion 2.2 –, and the digital release of secret
information. In his argument, Kreimer
(2001) states that the virtual sit-in is
probably as legal as repeatedly shouting
with the goal of making verbal commu-
nication impossible.
Samuel (2004) constituted a very de-
tailed and broad overview of hacktivism
and all its forms. One of the types dis-
tinguished is the performative hacktivism,
which she describes as legally ambigu-
ous. The group of performative hacktiv-
ists tries to take a more artistic approach
to pressing political issues. As one of their
instruments, the virtual sit-in is named.
Samuel (2004) notes that the virtual sit-
in may be a legal version of the DDoS.
2. Terminology
Since this paper offers a cross disciplin-
ary perspective on digital assemblies and
related subjects, consisting of both com-
puter science and legal studies, we will
start with the establishment of termino-
logy. This way, we can acknowledge the
different meanings of terms based on the
different fields of science and to prevent
us from misunderstandings. In this sec-
tion, we will touch upon the phenomena
of (distributed) denial of service, (virtual)
sit-ins, (online) activism, (cyber)terrorism
and other subjects fundamental to this re-
search.
2.1. (D)DoS
A denial of service (DoS) attack can be
defined as an attack on the availability
of a system (Anderson 2008). A distrib-
uted denial of service (DDoS) attack is the
same type of attack, but the attack ori-
ginates from multiple parties. There are
multiple techniques for executing a denial
of service attack on a computer system
(Kang, Zhang and Ju 2006). Currently, a
way to distinguish attacks is based on the
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method of attack. The method of flood-
ing boils down to sending lots of data to
a server until the maximum capacity is
reached and the machine is unable to pro-
cess new data requests or only able to do
so very slowly. This type of attack is most
often executed in a distributed fashion –
possibly using a network of hacked com-
puters –, because it takes lots of data re-
quests for a server to become unavailable.
Notice that this technique is also used for
load balance testing – tests aimed at find-
ing out the maximum number of users a
system can take.
Another method of attack is by exploit-
ing known weaknesses in the software used
on the server. Sending a single malicious
request to the target could lead to the
server software entering a deadlock, crash-
ing, or otherwise being pushed into deny-
ing service to other clients. One com-
mon technique to disable a server that
uses a relational database is SQL injection
(Kindy and Pathan 2011). SQL Injection
is a type of attack on a Web application
where the attacker provides SQL code –
the language used to query databases –
as user input to perform unauthorized ac-
tions. This type of attack may allow a
single attacker to shut down the service.
However, there are methods that lie in
between. For example, the DNS ampli-
fication attack, as described by Vaughn
and Evron (2006), abuses a property of
the DNS infrastructure – the subsystem
responsible for translating domain names
to IP-addresses. This makes it possible
for an attacker to generate 8.5 times more
traffic then with an ordinary (D)DoS at-
tack. Therefore, the critical group of at-
tackers, in case of a distributed attack, is
decrease by a proportion 8.5.
When regarding the physical world, the
usage of a method such as DNS amplific-
ation can be compared to a group of pro-
testers blocking a bottleneck of a build-
ing, e.g. a single entry to the construction.
The impact of this group increases signi-
ficantly by the use of a bottleneck, when
compared to their impact in an open field.
In this paper, we will consider whether
this is on the verge of permissible use of
weaknesses in an assembly or not.
Of course, the discussed techniques can
also be combined. For example, it is pos-
sible to use one of the techniques men-
tioned to attack other services, causing
the operating system to fail and making
the intended service unavailable.
For average users, some of the tech-
niques may be hard to understand.
However, there exist tools that al-
low for an attack by means of a
simple click on a button. Such
tools are, for example: TFN, TFN2K,
Mstream, Naphta, Stacheldracht-V2.66,
Stacheldrachtv4, Trinoo, Shaft, IRCbots,
FAPI, Targa, Trinity, LOIC3 (Dietrich,
Long and Dittrich 2000). For the sake
of simplicity, we exclude physical (D)DoS
attacks. In the rest of this paper, the
(D)DoS attack is defined as an attack on
the availability of an information system
from one or more remote systems capable
of achieving its goal – causing unavailab-
ility.
2.2. Virtual Sit-Ins
The virtual sit-in is when a large group
of people rapidly reloads a specific web
page (Samuel 2004). This method is pop-
ularised by a group of activists that calls
themselves the Electrohippies Collective
(Klang 2005). As opposed to traditional
distributed denial of service attacks, this
method requires the consent and active
participation of every participant. Thus,
the virtual sit-in requires a critical mass
in order to be of any effect.
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Furthermore, the method of virtual sit-
ins does not use the system different from
the normal use, besides that the amount
of requests is a lot higher than the nor-
mal case. In other words, the virtual sit-in
does not abuse the system in a technical
sense, e.g. using an exploit.
2.3. Online Activists
Samuel (2004) defines those that non-
violently use illegal or legally ambiguous
digital tools in pursuit of political goals as
hacktivists. According to her, hacktivists
are a special kind of online activists, that
do not necessarily obey order. In other
words, they show civil disobedience in the
digital world. We can apply this notion
of hacktivism to our view on digital act-
ivists. This also encapsulates online civil
disobedience.
In the digital world, activists may be-
have disobedient for political reasons. Ac-
cording to Klang (2005), these online act-
ivists exercise their fundamental rights to
freedom of expression4 and assembly5.
To give a bit more context, we will
describe some characteristics from two
self proclaimed prominent digital activist
groups. As will be explained, these ex-
amples do not qualify as digital assem-
blies.
2.3.1. Anonymous
One distinctive characteristic of Anonym-
ous is the fact that it does not have a uni-
form political opinion with the seemingly
exception of the ideal of absolute freedom
on the Internet – e.g. no filtering, censor-
ship or content based payment should be
allowed in their opinion. The communic-
ation is decentralized over a broad supply
of communication channels, such as im-
age boards, mailing lists and IRC chan-
nels. Since the communication is distrib-
uted and the participants are eclectic in
their opinions, there is not and cannot be
a leader nor spokesmen. Therefore, every
digital protest and no digital protest at
all can originate from Anonymous at the
same time.
One should always question a press
statement by Anonymous, because
chances are high that a statement is false
– note that blaming Anonymous is an
effective way to masquerade a digital at-
tack. The general method of Anonymous
consists of specifying a target and using
the method of DDoS for taking it down,
while asking for other participants on the
internet.
2.3.2. LulzSec
In comparison to Anonymous, LulzSec fo-
cuses on the confidentiality of a system
rather then the availability of a system.
LulzSec claims to actively hack systems
to publish personal data and credentials
stored by governments and multinational
corporations. Self proclaimed members of
LulzSec also claim to have delivered im-
portant documents to WikiLeaks.
Besides the ideal of absolute freedom
on the Internet, these activists share an
ideal of transparency of the government
and corporations to the society. It also
holds for LulzSec that they do not have
a spokesmen or leader. Therefore, every
statement should be treated with suspi-
cion, since the name of the group could
be misused to hide another attacker.
Under current legislation, it is clear that
the activities of LulzSec are illegal, as they
fall within the scope of offences such as
intrusion of information systems6. We
briefly discussed some characteristics of
LulzSec to provide an accurate overview
of hacktivism, but will not consider them
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nor refer to them in the rest of the paper.
2.4. The Legal Problem of
Jurisdiction
Two important legal problems arise when
concerned with legislation in the digital
world. First, we have the subsidiarity
legal problem – or the problem of jurisdic-
tion. As the digital world is much larger
than country borders prescribe, it is diffi-
cult to cope with cases where the national
legislation of two countries differ. At the
same time, world wide legislation is not
easily made – not even to mention enforce-
ment. We will not discuss this problem in
depth, as it is an entire issue in itself, but
it should be noted.
The second problem is the broad spec-
trum of already existing conventions,
which should be taken into account. In
our case, the Budapest Convention on
Cybercrime is of importance, which re-
quires the national governments to crim-
inalise the serious hindering of computer
systems7. Of course, this convention com-
plies with fundamental rights and imple-
ments related safeguards8. In Section 8,
we will return to this issue.
2.5. Technology Change and the
Impact on Law
It is important to have technology neut-
ral legislation, to the extent this is pos-
sible. This means that the legislator may
be aware of the technologies at hand, but
does not propose legislation that is spe-
cifically aimed at a certain technology. For
example, if an expensive DDoS-attack pre-
vention mechanism is invented, legislation
that permits specifically DDoSes as form
of assembly would be rendered mostly
useless. However, it may be clear that
with multidisciplinary problems, such as
those discussed in this paper, the legis-
lator should provide a technical appendix.
3. Fundamental Rights and
Digital Demonstrations
The right of assembly refers to the fun-
damental right for everyone to have a
peaceful assembly, which is granted in the
European Convention on Human Rights9.
This charter also grants the related right
of freedom of expression10. The right of
assembly may only be restricted when it is
done lawful, necessary in a democratic so-
ciety and this is in the interest of national
security or public safety, for the preven-
tion of disorder or crime, for the protec-
tion of health or morals, or for the protec-
tion of the rights and freedoms of others11.
In the Netherlands, the right of as-
sembly is granted in the Dutch Constitu-
tion12, as is the right of freedom of ex-
pression13. Nevertheless, in practice, the
rights granted by the European Conven-
tion on Human Rights14 is more import-
ant. This is due to the fact that the courts
may not judge acts of parliament and
treaties for compliance with the Dutch
constitution15. The right of assembly is
regulated in Dutch legislation via the Pub-
lic Manifestations Act16 (Ferdinandusse
2001). Restrictions may only be imposed
for protection of health or traffic, or to
fight or prevent disorder17.
It is important to note that the art-
icle of the Dutch constitution that grants
the right of assembly in its current form,
only came into force on 17 February 1988
(Schilder 1989). Since that change, the
constitution, literally translated, grants
the right of assembly and manifestation18,
where the change boils down to the ad-
dition of manifestation19. The legislator
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notes that manifestation refers to a group
of people publicly expresses their emotions
or wishes concerning a social or political
subject20. As, Schilder (1989) notes, this
may be seen as a collective form of the
freedom of expression.
Finally, in Germany, the constitution
grants the right of peaceful assembly
without registration and permission21.
However, this right may be limited when
the assembly is in the open and the limit-
ation is lawful22.
3.1. The Blockade as an
Assembly
Schilder (1989) notes that the Dutch le-
gislator, in response to the question if
a blockade may fit within the definition
of an assembly, remarked that an action,
where the aspect of collective expression
has faded in favour of a coercive character
towards the government or a third party,
cannot be seen as an assembly as meant
in the constitution23. However, later the
Minister of Internal Affairs added that
this does not mean that a manifestation
cannot have characteristics of a blockade.
Schilder (1989) summarises that as long as
an assembly in the form of a blockade does
not have the goal of imposing a decision
or action, it fits the definition.
In 1996, the court of appeal judged
in a case between a chlorine producer
Solvay and environment defence organisa-
tion Greenpeace24. Greenpeace had de-
cided to impose a blockade on the chlorine
transport of Solvay. Due to the fact that
Greenpeace did not notify Solvay, did not
consult the company on the consequences,
did not leave room for alternatives, and
did not clarify on the duration of their
blockade, the intervention with the affairs
of Solvay subordinated the interests of the
company overly to the interests pursued
by Greenpeace. This resulted into the
court ruling that the action of Greenpeace
should be qualified as a tort.
Furthermore, the Greenpeace vs Solvay
case shows that the freedom of expres-
sion25 may provide the right to infringe
other rights26. However, due to the com-
plete inconsideration of the interests of
Solvay, this argument does not hold. Sim-
ilarly, a ruling of the court of appeal in
The Hague showed that a blockade may
be allowed in the context of a strike under
very strict circumstances27.
In another case against Greenpeace, ori-
ginating from the summer of 1982, the
court states that as it is unavoidable that
some damages occur during an assembly,
this should be allowed to a certain de-
gree28 (Schilder 1989). Furthermore, per
action, there should be tailored criteria
based on to which extent the performing
party pursues a general interest, to which
extent this could be pursued differently,
and the proportionality between the pos-
sible damages and the pursued goal of the
action29.
Although the additional requirement of
peacefulness to the German right of as-
sembly30 seems unclear, especially when
concerned with blockades, the legislator
provides clarification in the German Act
on Assemblies and Processions (Schilder
1989). This act states that an assembly
may only be prohibited in individual
cases, where the organising party or his
supporters – not others that want to cre-
ate havoc at the expense of the assembly
– have a violent or inflammatory goal31.
The German constitutional court has
ruled that blockades – in this specific
case sit-ins – are not outside the scope of
the right of assembly, just because parti-
cipants are accused of violent coercion32,
as the constitutional notion of peaceful-
ness is not as narrow as the broad defin-
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ition of violence in the law seems to dic-
tate33 (Schilder 1989). However, six years
later, the constitutional court ruled that
the term assembly should be interpreted
as an orderly gathering of people parti-
cipating in the public building of opinion,
with a focus on discussion or manifesta-
tion34. Furthermore, this ruling decided
that it is not up to the parties acting upon
their right to assembly to decide how the
colliding rights of others may be limited.
Thus, blockades are allowed to that extent
where they are the normal side effect of an
assembly, and not when its the goal of the
assembly to hinder.
3.2. Assemblies in Privately
Held Locations
If and to what extent rights also have a
third-party applicability – or horizontal
function, which means that they can also
hold between two private parties and not
only between a private party and the gov-
ernment – is not stated in the European
Convention on Human Rights (Haeck and
Vande Lanotte 2005). However, it is clear
that the European Court of Human Rights
does not accept direct third-party ap-
plicability 35. Nevertheless, as Haeck
and Vande Lanotte (2005) remark, the
European Court on Human Rights has
accepted cases concerning indirect third-
party applicability including cases con-
cerned with the right of assembly36. In
such a case, a member state gets sued for
not protecting the fundamental rights of a
citizen against a third party.
The Dutch legislator remarks that fun-
damental rights may also have a hori-
zontal function37. As Haeck and Vande
Lanotte (2005) note, the legislator states
that the third-party applicability is to be
decided by the judge and not the legis-
lator. Thus, this is comparable to the
European case, where the judge has to bal-
ance the interests of the community and
those of the relevant parties.
Schilder (1989) discusses the Hoog
Catherijne-issue, named after the
privately held shopping mall at the
central station in Utrecht. Due to
the very public character of the mall,
which is highlighted even more by its
function as passageway, congress facil-
ity, and recreational area, the right of
assembly is applicable – assuming that
the fundamental right of assembly is not
solely meant for protection against the
government, but also has a horizontal
function.
It is important that the assembly has
a public character, as the Dutch legis-
lator notes38. Of course, it clearly does
not make sense to have a manifestation
in a location where nobody is able to see
it. The Dutch Public Manifestations Act
defines public locations as places that by
function or normal usage are open to the
public39. As Schilder (1989) mentions,
strikes are a bit different in this respect,
as they normally happen at the workplace.
Furthermore, the freedom of choice of loc-
ation and time of the assembly is deemed
important40 – this can also be concluded
from the ruling of the German constitu-
tional court41.
In conclusion, the public character of
an assembly is important for its perceived
goal as collective usage of the freedom of
expression. Therefore, a protest in a non-
public location does not fit the definition
of an assembly in most cases.
3.3. Relation of DDoS to
Fundamental Rights
Since the European Convention on Hu-
man Rights is from 1950, the right to a
digital assembly is obviously never gran-
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ted explicitly. However, as the medium
or infrastructure which is used to execute
the right to assembly42 is never explicitly
mentioned, one could argue that an as-
sembly executed over a digital medium,
e.g. the Internet, may well be allowed,
taking into account the restrictions on the
right43.
As a DDoS appears most as a type of
blockade, the notes on blockades as a form
of assembly are very relevant. Further-
more, this leads to interpreting virtual sit-
in – not necessarily following the definition
of virtual sit-in as proposed by the Elec-
trohippies Collective (Klang 2005) – also
as a type of blockade. Thus, we will inter-
pret the DDoS – and the related virtual
sit-in – using the doctrine of blockades and
sit-ins as methods of assembly.
By approaching the DDoS as a block-
ade, we first need to see if it fits in the
broad definition of an assembly. Thus, the
character of collective usage of the free-
dom of expression must be prevalent. If
this is true, we learn that a DDoS may
well be protected, albeit with very strict
restrictions. To start, the DDoS may in
no way be a method to force a party to
a decision or action. Finally, the interests
of the party that is subject to the DDoS
must be well-balanced against the goal
pursued by the protesting party, thereby
taking in account possible different meth-
ods to pursue this goal and the propor-
tionality between the damages and the
pursued goal.
As discussed before, the public char-
acter of an assembly is very important.
Therefore, if a DDoS does only result in
downtime, without the public having any
idea of the goals the protesters pursue, it
cannot be deemed an assembly.
3.4. Individual versus Collective
Actions
As discussed before, the Dutch constitu-
tion recognises the right to assembly and
manifestation44. However, it does not
make a distinction between individual and
collective assemblies – being computer sci-
entists, we consider an empty set still
as a set. Nevertheless, the Dutch legis-
lator gives collective meaning to the defin-
ition of assembly45. Furthermore, the
European Convention on Human Rights
does not make this distinction either46,
nor does it distinguish between the right
of assembly and collective freedom of ex-
pression47.
The Dutch Public Manifestations Act
does not provide direct clarification on the
difference between individual and collect-
ive actions48. However, this act does reg-
ulate that every municipality could have
a different implementation strategy of the
act in local regulations49. Therefore, it
is possible that one municipality makes
a distinction between collective and indi-
vidual protest and the other does not.
In practice, according to Embregts and
Nieuwenhuys (2007), there is a difference
in the right to protest as individual versus
the right to protest as a collective. As an
individual protests, this is not a case for
the right of assembly, but for the right of
free speech50. Therefore, the Public Mani-
festations Act is not applicable. There are
two exceptions. First, when other indi-
viduals spontaneously join the protest it
becomes an assembly. The second excep-
tion is when the individual protest is dur-
ing another protest.
In conclusion, a strictly individual
manifestation is protected by the free-
dom of speech and is not considered an
assembly. Therefore, individual actions
are even better protected by fundamental
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rights than collective actions, as there are
more safeguards implemented.
3.5. Boundaries on the
Fundamental Rights of
assembly
In 2007, the Dutch ombudsman released a
report in which the boundaries for a phys-
ical demonstration as described by the
Dutch public manifestations act51 are cla-
rified (Embregts and Nieuwenhuys 2007).
The ombudsman states that, although
protesting is a fundamental right, this
right may be infringed if the protest dis-
proportionally disrupts security, health or
property. The boundaries given by the
ombudsman could be a good base for test-
ing the digital protest. The first import-
ant boundary is that there is a registration
period of 4 days for a collective protest.
This makes it possible for the object pro-
tested against to enforce an injunction
if it thinks the protest disproportionally
harms his interest.
The second interesting point is that
the identification duty52 is widened (Em-
bregts and Nieuwenhuys 2007). The pro-
tester does not have to be suspected of a
criminal offence, but could be enforced to
identify himself as part of the protection
of order – even if the police already knows
the suspect. For regulating purposes, the
law enforcement authorities appreciate a
scheme from the organisation about the
way the protest is organised. This, how-
ever, is not an obligation.
A third interesting aspect is that in-
tervention of the police when the protest
is near an (important) government build-
ing is allowed (Embregts and Nieuwen-
huys 2007). A restriction is that it is for-
bidden to use tools which could be used
as weapons – such as sticks – during the
protest. This restriction could have in-
teresting implication in a digital protest.
The last obligation to the protest is that
the protesters have to leave the location
of protest clean after the action. This
could also have interesting implication for
a digital protest. Finally, the government
has a department for facilitating manifest-
ations and assemblies.
4. Criminal Law and
Availability Attacks
The Budapest Convention on Cybercrime,
which entered into force in 2004 and
was enacted in the Netherlands in 2007,
urges the national governments to crim-
inalise the intentionally and without right
hindering the functioning of a computer
system inputting, transmitting, dam-
aging, deleting, deteriorating, altering or
suppressing computer data53. At the
time of ratification, most Dutch law was
already in line with the convention54, part
of the pending act Computercriminaliteit
II55 – either originally or as an exten-
sion due to the convention. As the name
suggests, at this time, there already was
an act called Computercriminaliteit56,
which, amongst others, contained the first
criminalisations of attacks on the availab-
ility of automated systems.
Dutch law has several criminalisations
of attacks on the availability of automated
systems. To start, the intentionally ren-
dering unavailable of an system for tele-
communications is punishable with up to
a one year sentence if this affects the
transmission, storage or processing of data
within a public telecommunication net-
work or a public telecommunication ser-
vice; punishable with a sentence of up to
six years if this damages goods or ser-
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vice; punishable with a sentence of at most
nine years if this endangers life; and pun-
ishable with a sentence of up to fifteen
years if this led to death57. If the act was
unintentional, sentences drop to at most
six months in the first two cases, up to
one year in the third case, and at most
two years imprisonment in the last case58.
The legislator notes that these articles also
criminalise the creation of unavailability
by sending a lot of data to some electronic
address59.
The two offences discussed in the pre-
vious paragraph where introduced as the
modern society became more and more de-
pendent on automated systems60. The le-
gislator even thought computer networks
to be so important that a strike was not
accepted as an exception to the offences.
Nevertheless, it is later clarified by the
Dutch legislator that this article is only
concerned with automated systems of gen-
eral interest61. Furthermore, it is also
noted that it is not focussed on cases
where there only is slight interference and
no real damage to the services.
Furthermore, it is not allowed to in-
tentionally and without right make data
unavailable that is stored using an auto-
mated system62. If this is done with hack-
ing the sentence goes up to four years63,
and without up to two years64.
Finally, a sentence of at most one year
can be given for the intentionally and
without right making unavailable of an
automated system by sending or offering
it data65. One of the main motivators for
this article was spamming66.
4.1. Case law
In 2005, the local court in The Hague
decided that a DDoS attack may well
be punished under the conditions of the
first part of the first member of article
161sexies of the Dutch penal code67, as
it overloads the network thereby affect-
ing the complete automated work68. Fur-
thermore, in this specific case one website
was attacked, but the attack resulted in
downtime at other clients of the internet
service provider that hosted the attacked
website, which caused the judge to finding
the second part of the article also applic-
able, as the services offered where broadly
interrupted69.
In the higher appeal of these cases was
referred back to the comment of the legis-
lator that the articles the conviction was
based on where relevant70, even though
the article of the Dutch penal code spe-
cifically meant for DDoS attacks71 was
still pending in parliament72. The other
higher appeals had a comparable out-
come73.
However, another case from 200574 led
to acquittal for the court of appeal75. The
main motivation was that the court de-
cided it to be not proven that the net-
work of the given internet service provider
was endangered, only the specific system,
which made the court decide that article
161sexies of the Dutch penal code76 was
not applicable.
From the case law, we can learn that in
order to be convicted on the basis of art-
icle 161sexies of the Dutch penal code77,
at least an automated system of network
general interest needs to be endangered78.
Nevertheless, in cases where other web-
sites beside the website that is subject of
the ddos experience downtime, the article
is applicable again79.
4.2. Grounds of Justification
Mevis (2009) notes that the Dutch Penal
Code provides two types of grounds for
exclusion of criminal liability. Namely,
grounds for justification – grounds which
10
regard the wrongfulness of the act – and
grounds for excuse – grounds which regard
the culpability of the actor. Of these, only
the first type is of interest to our research,
as we are not interested in personal cir-
cumstances, but only in the general act.
Especially Force Majeur80 is of relev-
ance. This article provides, due to the
case law, both a ground for justification
as a ground for excuse (Mevis 2009). The
ground of justification created by this art-
icle, also known as state of emergency, jus-
tifies punishable behaviour when there is
a conflict between the duty to solve an
emergency and the duty to comply with
the law – given that the emergency is sub-
stantial in proportion to the criminalisa-
tion81. Mevis (2009) illustrates this type
of Force Majeur using a case where an op-
tician broke the law by opening his store
outside of the allowed shopping hours in
order to provide a client in dire need with
a pair of glasses82.
In some cases, the description of an
offence contains the requirement that it
happened without right (Mevis 2009).
The legislator normally adds this require-
ment when the described offence also fre-
quently happens rightfully. The addition
of without right requires the public pro-
secutor to explicitly prove that the action
was without right, whereas if this is omit-
ted, the action is always considered to be
without right, unless the defence submits
a ground for justification. In other words,
the burden of proof with regard to justi-
ficatory grounds is changed by the addi-
tion of without right. For example, the
description of the offence destruction83
contains the requirement without right,
which, amongst others, clears honest de-
molition companies of the possible crim-
inal charge of destruction.
As discussed before, one of the offences
commonly charged in cases concerning a
form of DDoS does not require the of-
fence to be without right84. Furthermore,
the legislator claims to have omitted this
requirement due to the dependability on
automated systems and networks in our
modern society85.
Mevis (2009) also mentions absence
of substantive wrongfulness, which is an
implicit ground for justification. This
provides a ground of justification when the
act perfectly fits the description of the of-
fence, but the offender objectively acted
in favour of the cause the criminalisation
tries to pursue86. However, this does not
fit idealistic causes87. Therefore, it is not
an applicable ground of justification in the
present research.
5. Policy of the Public
Prosecutor
As Mevis (2009) discusses, the public pro-
secutor may choose not to prosecute88. In
practice, there is the possibility of tech-
nical dismissal – when it is not likely the
prosecution will lead to a conviction – and
the dismissal on the basis of the expedi-
ency principle89 – when the public prosec-
utor decides prosecution is not opportune.
When the public prosecutor considers
a conviction possible, but thinks prosec-
ution is not in favour of the general in-
terest, he may decide to a dismissal out of
opportunity, as he considers prosecution
not to be opportune (Mevis 2009). This is
due to the fact that Dutch criminal law
is based on the principle of opportunity,
as opposed to the principle of legality –
as German criminal law is. Such a de-
cision that prosecution is not opportune
is a decision of policy. Furthermore, the
public prosecutor may create guidelines,
which describe when he will not prosec-
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ute. Thus, a decision to tolerate a certain
crime may be formulated in the form of
such a guideline – a common example in
Dutch criminal law is the policy on soft
drugs90 and euthanasia91.
Recently, the Public Prosecutor ordered
two suspects of performing a DDoS on the
websites of MasterCard and VISA to com-
munity service92. These actions were –
allegedly – performed with political reas-
ons, namely the blocking of donations to
WikiLeaks by these credit card companies
(Teffer 2010b; Teffer 2010a). The public
prosecutor decided not to prosecute the
suspects under one of the offences dis-
cussed in Section 4 – most notably 161sex-
ies of the Dutch penal code93 –, but use
their competence to give a punishment or-
der94 – which is allowed for offences penal-
ised with up to 6 years of detention. The
underage offender was ordered to 26 hours
of community service, whereas the older
suspect was ordered to 80 hours of com-
munity service.
6. Civil Disobedience
After discussing the (D)DoS method with
respect to the European rights, criminal
law and the policy of the public prosec-
utor we decided to analyse the (D)DoS
method with respect to civil disobedi-
ence to harvest (more) requirements which
could bind a legal requirement.
With civil disobedience, we mean events
in which citizens disobey the law, claiming
to do so for a greater good (Klang 2005).
An example of civil disobedience can be
found in Rosa Parks, who, in 1955, refused
to give up her seat in the bus to a white
man, whereby she broke the law.
She performed this action, to oppose
against discrimination and thereby break-
ing the dogma of racial differences.
In this section the guidelines provided
by Schuyt (1972) will be discussed in the
context of digital civil disobedience. His
first guideline prescribes that the violation
of law should be the result of a process of
deliberation. Therefore, the time and aim
of the action may not have a spontaneous
character. This guideline could be adop-
ted in the digital infrastructure without
the loss of generality.
The second guideline of Schuyt (1972)
describes that there must be a relation
between the method chosen to protest and
the objective of the protest. Therefore, if
the objective of protest concerns the phys-
ical infrastructure, then a digital protest
is not eligible until a later stage, when the
physical options are exhausted. However,
if the objective concerns the digital infra-
structure, then a digital protest is appro-
priate.
The third guideline prescribes public vi-
olation of the law (Schuyt 1972). If the
protester does not try to hide his actions,
he stands stronger in influencing the pub-
lic opinion. A typical DDoS attack could
be anonymous and mere downtime does
not express much opinion. Therefore, this
guideline needs technical adaptation when
imposed on DDoS as an assembly. Fur-
thermore, this also fits with the public
property that the Dutch legislator notes
of assemblies95.
Besides the requirement that the vi-
olation should have a public character,
Schuyt (1972) also requires voluntary co-
operation when prosecuted. Therefore,
the disobedient protester should not use
a proxy or other means of hiding and has
to store (forensic) evidence to be able to
cooperate with possible prosecution.
As a fifth requirement, Schuyt (1972)
notes the absence of violence. Although
the technique of DDoS is classified as an
attack, it does not necessarily cause phys-
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ical harm to individuals or property – al-
though it is possible. However, if the tech-
nique is used against critical systems as,
for example, SCADA systems (Cai, Wang
and Yu 2008), it could create major phys-
ical damage. Since the protester is not al-
ways able to decide whether a system he
blocks is important – for example, when
a website is run on the same mainframe
as a critical system –, the protester has
the responsibility to exclude this risk. In
Section 8, we will discuss both technical
and juridical requirements to mitigate this
risk.
A long manifestation could harm the in-
terests of other citizens, which could vi-
olate the sixth requirement: the rights
of others citizens should be respected as
much as possible. Nevertheless, this,
again, boils down to an act of balancing
the interests of all involved parties.
The seventh requirement from Schuyt
(1972) prescribes that all legal resources
need to be exhausted. One should not
directly resort to civil disobedience, but
first seek to use other resources such as
influencing the public opinion, trying to
enforce your rights in court, and the likes.
This requirement does not differ from the
physical world, because most of the legal
resources are constituted in the physical
world.
The disobedient citizen has to accept
the risk of being punished (Schuyt 1972).
For common violations (e.g. entering
private terrain or temporary occupation)
the maximal punishment could be accept-
able to the disobedient. However, the
punishment for a DDoS could be 6 years.
Finally, the disobedient citizens is act-
ing as he does to provoke a trial case in
court, in order to test his moral grounds
of justifications for a judge.
7. Recap of Current
Legislation
To get a good picture of the status
quo of digital manifestation in Dutch
and European legislation, we performed a
thorough legal study. At this point, we
will summarise the results of the legal part
of the research and give a brief description
of the current status of the digital right to
assembly.
In Section 3, we have seen under which
conditions the DDoS may be considered
as a method of exercising the right to as-
sembly. To start, the DDoS has to fit
the description of an assembly, which re-
quires it to have a public character and
to have a prevalent character of collective
expression of opinion (definition). Fur-
thermore, the DDoS can be seen as a vir-
tual blockade – and, thus, virtual sit-in.
This gives the following requirements for
a DDoS to be considered as covered by the
right to assembly: reasonable alternatives
have already been pursued (subsidiar-
ity), the (possible) damages of the mani-
festation are proportional to the interests
of the party subject to the protest (pro-
portionality), and the protest is in the
general interest (necessary). As we have
also seen, in Germany it would be required
that the blocking effect of the DDoS is a
side effect of a normal peaceful assembly,
which will commonly not be the case.
Especially the requirement of visibility
makes it hard for a DDoS to be deemed
a reasonable blockade, as this would re-
quire artificial interventions, such as the
use of social networking, microblogs or
comparable services, where the protesting
citizens unite. As the activity should have
a character of publicly collectively exer-
cising the freedom of expression and not
of hindering services, a loosely connecting
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campaign on a social networking site could
be seen as the assembly, but the DDoS
itself would still be questionable. How-
ever, their may be variants possible that
withstand this requirement, such as flood-
ing an email-address or contact form with
the message of the protest. Please note
that requirements considering the balan-
cing of interest or the pursuing of the goal
through other means make it less likely for
a DDoS to be considered as means of ex-
ercising the right to assembly in practice,
they do not make the change for that to
happen negligible.
As we saw in Section 4, the DDoS is
criminalised in Dutch legislation. How-
ever, it is not completely unambiguous
which offences in particular fit the bill in
general, which leaves this task to case law.
Due to the omission, of without right in
the most commonly used offence, any ac-
tion that fits the description is considered
to be without right. In combination with
the importance the Dutch legislator has in
mind, when it comes down to information
networks, it seems unlikely the court will
allow an appeal to necessity as a ground
of justification using the right to assembly
in a DDoS case.
Therefore, we can safely assume that,
in most cases, it is not possible to call
upon the right to assembly for a DDoS
attack. Furthermore, there currently is no
policy of the public prosecutor considering
digital rights, which we discussed in Sec-
tion 5. Nevertheless, the door is still open
to the in Section 6 discussed phenomenon
of civil disobedience.
8. Embodying the Digital
Right to Assembly in
Legislation
For the next step in this research, we will
ask ourselves to what extent digital as-
semblies should be possible and how this
should be embodied in the current legis-
lation. As the first question – whether
the digital assembly should be possible –
is mostly a political question, we will fo-
cus on the second question. In order to do
this, we will first evaluate if this requires
extending or creating fundamental rights,
followed by the possibility of the public
prosecutor issuing a special policy.
8.1. Extending Current Rights
In the Dutch constitution, the secrecy
of correspondence is granted96 (Asscher
1999). As this only protects written let-
ters, telegraphs, and telephone conversa-
tions, it is not of use for other forms of
communication. However, nowadays, the
right to privacy97 is understood as also
including private communication. Thus,
privacy was extended to fill the gap of the
secrecy of correspondence of other forms
of communication. In analogy to this ex-
ample, we will evaluate whether an exten-
sion of the existing fundamental rights is
feasible.
As discussed in Section 3, the Dutch
constitution grants the right to assembly
and manifestation98, as opposed to the
European Convention on Human Rights,
which only grants the right to assembly99.
Merely the addition of a right to mani-
festation to the right to assembly may en-
able digital assemblies under strict condi-
tions – that fit in with the requirements
we will discuss in Section 9. Furthermore,
this solution clarifies the general place of
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the manifestation, which lies somewhere
between the right to assembly100, the right
to freedom of expression101, and the right
to association102.
There are two noteworthy risks with
extending existing rights. Firstly, most
rights form a foundation for other legis-
lation that builds on it, which leads to
difficulties when those rights are changed.
Secondly, it can feel as if the legislator
tried very hard to fit in additional rights
with current legislation, when there actu-
ally are enough differences to justify intro-
ducing a new right.
8.2. Creating New Rights
When the Dutch government found that
intrusion into information systems was
not punishable under trespassing, the le-
gislator decided to create a new offence
for intrusion into information systems103.
The new offence is based upon the offence
of trespassing, but is also an adaptation
to the digital world. With this example
in mind, we will discuss the creation of
a new fundamental right to enable digital
assemblies.
The discussed right to manifestation
could also be introduced as a separate
right, which has some benefits. Most not-
ably, this makes the right truly separate
of previous rights, and does not give it the
position of little brother in comparison to
the right to assembly. Furthermore, this
leaves room for a more specific approach
to the right and its safe guards.
The most notable backside to introdu-
cing new rights is that this eventually
leads to devaluation due to the existence
of too much fundamental rights. However,
it seems that the right of manifestation is
recognised highly, and thus not capable of
causing such devaluation.
8.3. Policy of the Public
Prosecutor
As we discussed in Section 5, it may be
possible to protect the digital assembly
by policy of the public prosecutor. As
policies of the public prosecutor are a typ-
ical Dutch phenomenon, this approach is
not very useful in the global issues gen-
erated by the digital world. However, it
may be of use as a temporary solution.
9. Requirements for Digital
Assemblies
A digital assembly should comply with a
number of requirements. To find these re-
quirements, we will look back at the gen-
eral doctrine on assemblies and try to ad-
opt this to the general world. In addition,
we will consider differences between the
digital and the physical world and try to
find requirements that settle these differ-
ences.
In Appendix A, the relations of the sev-
eral proposed requirements to each other
and the general doctrine are displayed
graphically. These figures are referred for
a more detailed overview of the require-
ments.
9.1. Defining Digital Assemblies
We have seen that the Dutch legislator
considers a manifestation as a group of
people that publicly expresses their emo-
tions or wishes concerning a social or
political subject104 and that the German
constitutional court decided that an as-
sembly should be interpreted as an orderly
gathering of people participating in the
public building of opinion, with a focus on
discussion or manifestation105 Our idea of
a digital assembly will build further upon
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these perceptions. Thus, we will consider
visibility, the expression of opinion, and
collectivity as requirements.
9.1.1. Visibility
That assemblies should be visible is one
of the major requirements to an assembly,
as this can make the difference between
an action where the goal of hindering is
prevalent and an action where the goal
of publicly expressing an opinion prevails.
The same goes for a digital assembly.
Thus, the public should be able to see the
opinion that the assembly tries to express.
9.1.2. Expression of Opinion
Besides being public, in an assembly the
goal of collectively expressing an opinion
should prevail. This means that a digital
assembly should be politically or socially
motivated, and not be aimed at, for ex-
ample, smear campaigns106.
9.1.3. Collectivity
The collective character of an assembly is
one of the reasons of its power. If a very
large group of citizens opposes a certain
decision, they are more likely to be heard,
than if an individual does.
However, in the digital world, automa-
tion is cheap. Thus, one could act as if
he is a group of people. Therefore, the
requirement of collectivity prescribes the
one man, one vote principle.
Furthermore, a certain proportionality
between the size of the target and the size
of the participants in the assembly and the
impact of the assembly is important. In
other words, assemblies require a certain
critical mass, in order to be of effect.
9.2. Permissibility of Digital
Assemblies
The court evaluates the permissibility of
an assembly on several conditions. First
of all, the action may not be a method
to force some party to a decision or ac-
tion – please note that this is also in line
with the general requirement that the ex-
pression of opinion should be a prevalent
characteristic. Secondly, the goal pursued
by the protesting party should be well-
balanced against the interests of the other
party, especially concerning possible dam-
ages. Finally, other possible methods to
pursue the goal should have been taken
into account or tried.
9.2.1. No Coercion
As stated before, the non-permissibility
of coercion lies also with the requirement
that an assembly is mainly about the ex-
pression of opinion and not about hinder-
ing or comparable goals. Of course, there
is a slight difference, as the assembling
party may try to force the opposing party
with social pressure to follow the opin-
ion they are expressing. However, forcing
them at gunpoint is obviously not per-
missible at all, and can be considered a
form of coercion.
9.2.2. Proportionality
As we have seen before, proportionality
is always an important consideration. In
this case, it is of great importance that
there is a balance between the goal that is
pursued and the interests of the party that
is subject to the protest. For example,
if a protest aims at a local milk factory
which actually is bound by the decisions
of the municipality, the protest may not
be proportional. However, if it was their
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own decision that caused the protest, it
may be proportional.
The same reasoning could be used for
damages. A small wrong does not justify
a lot of damages, but a large issue may.
Proportionality between the pursued goal
and the potential damage to the interests
of the opposing party is, thus, an import-
ant requirement. For this, the practicalit-
ies can be left to the judge.
9.2.3. Subsidiarity
An assembly – especially a more intrusive
one – should probably not be the first an-
swer when someone feels their interests –
or opinions – are not heard. It is import-
ant that those that want to express their
opinion have followed other possible paths
in the pursue of their goal, before they
step up to more heavier methods, such as
the assembly. Therefore, it is important to
evaluate whether other methods of reach-
ing the intended goals are sufficiently ex-
hausted.
9.3. Enabling Orderly Digital
Assemblies
Finally, there are requirements which
make digital assemblies orderly. These re-
quirements are of a lower importance, as
they are not as much build on the legality
of the digital assembly, but say something
about the ability to keep order. This is
not only beneficial for the authorities, but
also for the protesters, as they have less
chance of their assembly getting hijacked
for violent or otherwise unwanted reasons.
In practice, the municipality regulates
the held manifestations (Embregts and
Nieuwenhuys 2007). Although most of the
regulations by the municipality are not
strictly required, protesters are urged to
comply with them, to prevent excesses.
This leads to a central organisation for
each assembly, which also announces the
activity. Furthermore, the police will
provide supervision, which will take action
when individuals step beyond the law.
9.3.1. Supervision
Within a physical demonstration, the
presence of law enforcement officers is
a preventive measure against escalation.
The officers can inform the mayor about
the status of the protest, providing him
with information to make a decision
whether the protest should be broken up.
This requirement is hard to satisfy,
since the anonymous nature of the Inter-
net prevents it, although it could be sat-
isfied when part of the infrastructure is
provided by the government. Neverthe-
less, chances are fairly high that this infra-
structure raises distrust and may for that
reason not be used.
9.3.2. Central Organisation
Most of the larger manifestations have a
central organisation. This organisation re-
gisters the manifestation with the muni-
cipality and tries to help the law enforce-
ment to keep the organisation orderly.
However, in Section 3.5, we saw that it
is not required to register a manifestation
nor to have a central organisation.
Even a digital assembly requires some
sort of announcement to gather those who
want to protest at the right time, for the
protest to be successful. After this ac-
tion, the protest can be considered re-
gistered. In addition, details of the mani-
festation could be provided using some
sort of pseudonymity or anonymity.
9.3.3. Announcement
Commonly, the municipality asks its cit-
izens to register manifestations. Although
this is not always required – for ex-
ample, ad hoc manifestations cannot be
registered –, this is an interesting require-
ment to discuss, due to the risk of miscon-
figuration of a system, which could lead to
much extremer effects than expected in a
normal situation.
An announcement should be unambigu-
ous and provably delivered to the legal
subject who is subject to the manifest-
ation. This gives the legal subject of
protest the option to ask for a delay or
rejection by filing an injunction in court.
The time granted by the judge should be
sufficient to prevent great disaster. How-
ever, it should not be sufficient to disarm
the protesting party. For example, if the
subject of the protest does not repair the
misconfiguration, the protest will be al-
lowed at some point. Please note that, in
this example, this badly configured server
is targeted, not the misconfiguration itself.
10. Technical
Requirements for
Digital Assemblies
In this section, we will discuss the tech-
nical requirements, based on the legal
requirements, to make digital assemblies
possible. Based on the requirement of vis-
ibility, we will introduced a technical re-
quirement concerning visibility. The re-
quirement of collectivity brings us to in-
troduce one man one vote, and group pro-
portionality as technical requirements.
We will also consider additional require-
ments that provide for an orderly as-
sembly. From the legal requirement of su-
pervision, we come to the use of revocable
anonymity. Finally, although we noticed
the existence of central organisations in
Section 9.3.2, technically we acknowledge
the importance of a decentralised solution.
10.1. Visibility
A concrete example, which satisfies the
visibility requirement, is protesting by e-
mail. If a digital assembly is shaped in
the form of sending multiple e-mails at a
predefined time as a group, it will have
the properties of an attack on the availab-
ility of a system. Furthermore, if enough
individuals participate in sending e-mails
with, for example, large attachments and
prevention against technical countermeas-
ures, such as spam filters, the content is
clearly visible to the subject of the protest.
The visibility becomes even stronger if
carbon copies are used, in order to send a
copy of the e-mail to a public place, where
it is for everyone to see (Resnick 2008).
The i-box of the party that is subject to
the protest may become so full that it is
not feasible to use at that moment. Even
stronger, the memory of the mail server
could fill up and cause the server to crash,
which is a (D)DoS by definition (Bass
et al. 1998). A recent example of such a
protest over e-mail is when a Dutch mem-
ber of the European Parliament placed
a call on citizens to send protest e-mails
against ACTA to all the members of the
European Parliament107.
Within a physical demonstration, the
ground where the protesters assemble is
impervious for other people. However,
when they watch the assembly from above
– e.g. from a building – or from the side,
they can clearly see the statements of the
group. Beside carbon copying protest e-
mails to publicly accessible boards, social
media could get filled with the collectively
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expressed opinion of the manifestation.
10.2. One Man, One Vote
The infrastructure must ensure that each
person has at most one vote – e.g. one
device – in the manifestation. In the ex-
ample of one device, this device may not
be able to generate more than the average
of possible request, i.e. super computers
are not allowed.
This requirement mainly ensures that
the use of bot-networks (Rajab et al. 2006)
or hired server park capacity does not be-
come legal for the use of protesting. It also
contributes to the requirement of group
proportionality on which we will elabor-
ate in Section 10.3.
10.3. Group Proportionality
The impact of the assembly should be pro-
portional to the size of the target and the
size of the group of participants to the as-
sembly. Therefore, it should not be pos-
sible for one person to take down another
party single handed – e.g. by exploiting a
vulnerability. Comparably, a small group
of protesters should not be able to take
down a corporation that is much larger.
Thus, the used techniques should com-
ply with this requirement of group pro-
portionality.
10.4. Revocable Anonymity
An important requirement for a protest is
that the protesters are anonymous. How-
ever, when one of the protesters abuse
the anonymity by, for example, trying to
hack the server, the investigative authorit-
ies should be able to track this individual
down. Since these authorities should not
be able to track the whole group down or
otherwise abuse this procedure, revocable
anonymity can be put in place (Kpsell,
Wendolsky and Federrath 2006).
For revocable anonymity to work, some
entity needs to be in charge of revoca-
tion. This can be implemented in multiple
ways. For example, critical mass based re-
vocation could be used, where the protest-
ers give up on people trying to disturb the
event.
10.5. Decentralised
As a non-negligible amount of the mani-
festations is aimed at the government,
people may not have trust in a infrastruc-
ture which is actively maintained or sup-
plied by that same government. There-
fore, it may not be effective for a gov-
ernment to straightforwardly implement
these requirements.
Furthermore, as decentralisation is in
the very veins of the Internet, the di-
gital assembly infrastructure should be as
decentralised as possible, thereby omit-
ting central contributors to the infrastruc-
ture, such as the government. In addition,
the government should only contribute to
parts that are necessary for law enforce-
ment in the case a manifestation escalates.
11. Conclusion
In this paper, we have investigated the di-
gital right of assembly, especially consid-
ering attacks on the availability of inform-
ation systems as assembly, e.g. the DDoS.
This lead us to conclude that, in most
cases, such attacks cannot be deemed a
means of exercising the right to assembly.
This is due to the fact that such attacks,
which can be seen as digital blockades,
do commonly not have a public character.
Furthermore, the Dutch legislator argues
that the digital infrastructure is of such
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importance that attacks on the availabil-
ity of information systems should almost
always be unlawful.
We learned that an effective way of cre-
ating the right to digital assemblies can
be found in granting the right to mani-
festation, which is currently only granted
by the Dutch constitution108 and thus not
invocable in court109.
Finally, we discussed the requirements
that should be met to conform to the
definition of a digital assembly – visibil-
ity, expression of opinion, and collectiv-
ity –, which resulted in the technical re-
quirements of visibility, one man one vote,
and group proportionality. We also noted
requirements for a digital assembly to
be permissible, namely a lack of coer-
cion, proportionality, and subsidiarity. Fi-
nally, we found that digital assemblies can
be held orderly by implementing revoc-
able anonymity, acknowledging decentral-
isation, and allowing some means of an-
nouncement.
11.1. Further Research
Some of the threads started in this paper
are of interest for future research. Digital
assemblies also have a social component.
In future research, the social influences of
a digital assembly and the power this gives
to the participants should be studied. Re-
lated to this, the dynamics of group pro-
portionality, as proposed in Section 10.3,
could be evaluated.
The proposed fundamental rights
should be further evaluated. The inter-
sections between the digital assembly and
the Budapest Convention on Cybercrime
also require further research. This could
be extended to the related directions and
regulations of the European Union.
The issue of jurisdiction will continue
to be of high importance, especially when
it concerns digital topics. In this case,
it should be explored what happens when
the European legislator grants its citizens
the digital right to assembly and the gov-
ernment of the USA does not grant this.
This question could also be expanded
to collaboration between the European
Union and the USA in police activities.
Some legal requirements are not eas-
ily translated to technical requirements,
due to their nature. However, this does
leave gaps, as shown in the figures in Ap-
pendix A. Therefore, we recommend fur-
ther research on this translation, with a
focus on those topics that are not suit-
able for direct translation to technical re-
quirements. Additionally, several tech-
nical topics are worth further pursuance,
such as the implementation of revocable
anonymity.
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A. Relations of the
Requirements
In figure 1, the relations of the require-
ments of the proposed definition of a di-
gital assembly are displayed. Figure 2
does the same for the requirements con-
cerning the permissibility of a digital as-
sembly. Finally, figure 3 concerns the re-
quirements for orderly digital assemblies.
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Definition of a
digital assembly
A group of people
that publicly expresses
their opinion ( 7)
Visibility ( 9.1.1)
Expression of
opinion ( 9.1.2)
Collectivity ( 9.1.3)
Visibility ( 10.1)
One man
one vote ( 10.2)
Group
proportionality ( 10.3)
Figure 1: Relations of the requirements of the proposed definition of a digital assembly.
Permissibility of a
digital assembly
The protest is in the
general interest ( 7)
Possible damages
are proportional ( 7)
Alternatives
have been pursued ( 7)
Expression of
opinion ( 9.1.2)
No coercion ( 9.2.1)
Proportionality ( 9.2.2)
Subsidiarity ( 9.2.3)
Figure 2: Relations of the requirements concerning the permissibility of a digital
assembly.
Order within a
digital assembly
Police
supervises ( 9.3)
Central
organisation that
anounces ( 9.3)
Supervision ( 9.3.1)
Central
organisation ( 9.3.2)
Announcement ( 9.3.3)
Revocable
anonymity ( 10.4)
Decentralised ( 10.5)
Figure 3: Relations of the requirements to an orderly a digital assembly.
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